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____________ 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
____________ 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Ricardo Marrero appeals his judgment of sentence 
after pleading guilty to two counts of bank robbery.  Marrero 
claims the District Court erred in classifying him as a “career 
offender” under § 4B1.1 of the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines.  Because we agree with the District Court that 
Marrero’s convictions for simple assault and third-degree 
murder qualify as “crimes of violence,” we will affirm. 
I 
 In December 2010, Marrero pleaded guilty to two 
counts of bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a).  
Thereafter, the Probation Office prepared a Presentence 
Investigation Report (PSR), which recommended that 
Marrero be sentenced as a career offender under § 4B1.1 of 
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the United States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG or 
Guidelines) because he had three convictions for crimes of 
violence: (1) third-degree murder under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. § 2502(c) in 1997; (2) simple assault under 18 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. Ann. § 2701(a)(1) in 2004; and (3) the bank robberies in 
this case. 
 The PSR described Marrero’s third-degree murder 
conviction as follows.  In 1997, a man named Guy Prange 
approached Marrero and others outside a house in 
Coatesville, Pennsylvania, and asked for drugs.  He was told 
they did not have any drugs.  When Prange began walking 
away, Marrero ran up and hit him from behind, knocking him 
to the ground.  Marrero then kicked Prange numerous times.  
Prange died in the hospital twenty-five days later from 
complications from a ruptured spleen.  In September 2002, 
Marrero pleaded guilty to murder in the third degree. 
 The PSR also indicated that Marrero pleaded guilty to 
simple assault following two attacks on his wife in 2004.  The 
transcript of Marrero’s guilty plea colloquy states, in relevant 
part: 
 [Assistant District Attorney]:  Your 
Honor, the defendant is charged with two 
separate incidents of simple assault.  On 
Information 2804-04, the date of May 29 of 
2004 . . . the defendant was seen placing his 
hands on the victim’s neck.  The victim’s name 
is Lucy Marrero.  And he did, at that time, 
threaten serious bodily injury.  On Information 
38 –  
 The Court: Do you admit those facts? 
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 The Defendant:  Yes, Sir. 
 [Assistant District Attorney]:  On 
Information 3839-04, the date was April 27, 
2004, . . . the defendant grabbed Mrs. Marrero 
by the neck, attempting to drag her upstairs to 
the second floor.  When she tried to make a 
phone call, he ripped the phone cord out of the 
wall as she was attempting to call 911. 
 The Court:  Do you admit those facts? 
 The Defendant:  Yes, Sir. 
The Probation Office concluded that Marrero’s 
convictions for third-degree murder and simple assault 
constituted “crimes of violence” under the Guidelines.  
Accordingly, the PSR classified Marrero as a career offender, 
which increased his offense level from 21 to 32.  After a 
three-point reduction for acceptance of responsibility, 
Marrero’s total offense level was 29.  The career offender 
enhancement also increased his criminal history category 
from IV to VI.  See USSG § 4B1.1(b).  This resulted in a final 
Guidelines range of 151 to 188 months’ imprisonment.  Had 
Marrero not been deemed a career offender, his Guidelines 
range would have been 57 to 71 months. 
 Marrero objected to the career offender classification, 
arguing that under Pennsylvania law neither third-degree 
murder nor simple assault qualifies as a crime of violence 
because “a conviction for mere recklessness cannot constitute 
a crime of violence.”  The District Court disagreed, holding 
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that he was a career offender under USSG § 4B1.1.  
According to the District Court, Marrero’s simple assault 
conviction was a crime of violence because: (1) our decision 
in United States v. Johnson, 587 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2009), 
established that intentional or knowing simple assault under 
Pennsylvania law is a crime of violence; and (2) the transcript 
of Marrero’s guilty plea colloquy “indicated that he pled 
guilty to an intentional and knowing violation of the simple 
assault statute.”  As for Marrero’s third-degree murder 
conviction, the District Court found that it constituted a crime 
of violence because “murder” is expressly enumerated as 
such in Application Note 1 to USSG § 4B1.2. 
Having found the career offender designation 
appropriate in Marrero’s case, the District Court agreed with 
the Probation Office that his applicable Guidelines range was 
151 to 188 months’ imprisonment.  Marrero sought a below-
Guidelines sentence, and the Government opposed that 
request.  Applying the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(a), the District Court determined that a substantial 
downward variance was warranted and sentenced Marrero to 
96 months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised 
release. 
Marrero timely appealed and has raised one issue: his 
classification as a career offender.  If either of his prior 
offenses is not a crime of violence, Marrero’s sentence, which 
was based in part on his career offender designation, cannot 
stand.  See, e.g., United States v. Keller, 666 F.3d 103, 109 
(3d Cir. 2011); United States v. Friedman, 658 F.3d 342, 359 
(3d Cir. 2011). 
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II 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 
and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1).  Whether a prior conviction 
constitutes a crime of violence for purposes of the career 
offender Guideline is a question of law over which we 
exercise plenary review.  E.g., Johnson, 587 F.3d at 207. 
III 
 Our legal analysis begins with the text of the relevant 
Guidelines.  Under USSG § 4B1.1, one is a career offender if: 
(1) [he] was at least eighteen years old at the 
time [he] committed the instant offense of 
conviction; (2) the instant offense of conviction 
is a felony that is either a crime of violence or a 
controlled substance offense; and (3) [he] has at 
least two prior felony convictions of either a 
crime of violence or a controlled substance 
offense. 
Under the Guidelines, “crime of violence” 
means any offense under federal or state law, 
punishable by imprisonment for a term 
exceeding one year, that— 
(1)  has as an element the use, attempted 
use, or threatened use of physical force 
against the person of another, or 
(2)  is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or 
extortion, involves use of explosives, or 
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otherwise involves conduct that presents 
a serious potential risk of physical injury 
to another. 
USSG § 4B1.2(a).  Finally, Application Note 1 to USSG 
§ 4B1.2 provides that “‘[c]rime of violence’ includes murder, 
manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault, forcible sex 
offenses, robbery, arson, extortion, extortionate extension of 
credit, and burglary of a dwelling.” 
A 
The first question presented is whether Marrero’s 
Pennsylvania simple assault conviction is a qualifying offense 
for purposes of the career offender Guideline.  See USSG 
§ 4B1.1.  Under Pennsylvania law, “[a] person is guilty of 
[simple] assault if he: (1) attempts to cause or intentionally, 
knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury; (2) negligently 
causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon; [or] (3) 
attempts by physical menace to put another in fear of 
imminent bodily injury.”  18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2701(a).  
Apart from “aggravated assault,” assault is not enumerated in 
either § 4B1.2(a)(2) of the Guidelines or the application note 
thereto, and neither party argues that Marrero’s simple assault 
conviction could qualify as a crime of violence under 
§ 4B1.2(a)(1).  Therefore, we must determine whether 
Marrero’s simple assault offense was a crime of violence 
under the so-called “residual clause” in § 4B1.2(a)(2), which 
refers to offenses that “otherwise involve[] conduct that 
presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” 
As we noted in Johnson, the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008), altered the 
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analytical framework for residual clause cases.1
                                                 
1 Although Begay and several related cases involved 
sentencing enhancements under the Armed Career Criminal 
Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), rather than the career 
offender Guideline, they nevertheless bind our analysis.  
“Precedent . . . requires the application of case law 
interpreting ‘violent felony’ in ACCA to ‘crime of violence’ 
in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2[] because of the substantial similarity of 
the two sections.”  United States v. Herrick, 545 F.3d 53, 58 
(1st Cir. 2008); accord, e.g., Hopkins v. United States, 555 
U.S. 1132 (2009) (mem.) (remanding a career offender case 
for consideration after the Supreme Court’s ACCA opinion in 
Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122 (2009)); United 
States v. Hopkins, 577 F.3d 507, 511 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[T]he 
definition of a violent felony under the ACCA is sufficiently 
similar to the definition of a crime of violence under the 
Sentencing Guidelines that authority interpreting one is 
generally applied to the other . . . .”). 
  587 F.3d at 
207.  Reasoning that the residual clause must be interpreted 
with reference to the enumerated crimes that precede it—
namely, burglary, arson, extortion, and crimes involving the 
use of explosives—the Supreme Court concluded that the 
residual clause “covers only similar crimes, rather than every 
crime that ‘presents a serious potential risk of physical injury 
to another.’”  Begay, 553 U.S. at 142 (quoting 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)).  Accordingly, “[p]ost-Begay, to qualify as 
a crime of violence [under the residual clause] the crime in 
question ‘must (1) present a serious potential risk of physical 
injury and (2) be “roughly similar, in kind as well as degree 
of risk posed, to the examples [of burglary, arson, extortion, 
or use of explosives] themselves.”’”  Johnson, 587 F.3d at 
207–08 (third alteration in original) (quoting United States v. 
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Polk, 577 F.3d 515, 518 (3d Cir. 2009)).  And “[a] crime is 
similar in kind to one of the enumerated examples if it 
‘typically involve[s] purposeful, violent, and aggressive 
conduct.’”  Id. at 208 (quoting Begay, 553 U.S. at 144–45). 
To determine whether Marrero’s case satisfies the 
residual clause, we first apply the categorical approach 
prescribed by the Supreme Court in United States v. Taylor, 
495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990).  This approach requires us to ask 
“whether the elements of the offense are of the type that 
would justify its inclusion within the residual provision, 
without inquiring into the specific conduct of this particular 
offender.”  James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 202 (2007); 
accord Johnson, 587 F.3d at 208.  In Begay, the Court 
concluded that the offense of driving under the influence of 
alcohol did not meet these residual-clause criteria.  553 U.S. 
at 144–48.  After Begay, “a conviction for mere recklessness 
cannot constitute a crime of violence” under the residual 
clause.  United States v. Lee, 612 F.3d 170, 196 (3d Cir. 
2010).  As we have explained, the Begay Court’s “repeated 
invocation of ‘purposefulness,’ and the contrast the Court 
drew between that state of mind and negligence or 
recklessness, suggest that a crime committed recklessly is not 
a crime of violence.”  Johnson, 587 F.3d at 210 n.8.  Our 
sister circuits that have considered this question have reached 
the same conclusion.  See id. (listing cases). 
We have previously applied Begay and Taylor to 
determine whether a conviction for simple assault under 
Pennsylvania law qualifies as a crime of violence under the 
residual clause of USSG § 4B1.2(a)(2).  In Johnson, we held 
that only “an intentional or knowing violation of subsection 
(a)(1) of [§ 2701] may qualify as a crime of violence ‘in the 
ordinary case.’”  587 F.3d at 210–12.  We reasoned that 
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“there can be no doubt that simple assault is at least as violent 
and aggressive as the enumerated crimes because a defendant 
who intentionally or knowingly commits [simple assault] 
intends to impair the victim’s physical condition or cause her 
substantial pain, [and] no such objective is required by the 
enumerated crimes.”  Id. at 212. 
Whether Marrero’s prior conviction was for intentional 
or knowing simple assault, rather than merely reckless or 
negligent iterations of the crime, depends on the statutory 
elements of which Marrero was actually convicted.  Id. at 
208; accord United States v. Stinson, 592 F.3d 460, 462 (3d 
Cir. 2010).  To make this determination, we apply a modified 
categorical approach, in which we are “generally limited to 
examining the statutory definition, charging document, 
written plea agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, and any 
explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which the 
defendant assented.”  Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 
16 (2005).  Whether one of these Shepard-approved 
documents “contains sufficient information to permit a 
conclusion about the character of the defendant’s previous 
conviction will vary from case to case.”  Johnson, 587 F.3d at 
213. 
Marrero concedes that the District Court was permitted 
to consult his plea colloquy to determine the type of simple 
assault of which he was convicted.  Appellant’s Br. 33.  He 
argues, however, that the District Court’s inquiry was limited 
to determining only the elements of § 2701(a) to which he 
pleaded guilty.  He claims that the District Court exceeded 
this boundary by looking to specific facts established during 
the colloquy rather than solely to any statutory elements set 
forth in the record.  In support, Marrero cites a statement by 
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in United States 
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v. Woods, 576 F.3d 400 (7th Cir. 2009), that “the additional 
materials permitted by Shepard may be used only to 
determine which crime within a statute the defendant 
committed, not how he committed the crime,” id. at 405. 
Our inquiry under Shepard’s modified categorical 
approach is not as constrained as Marrero suggests.  It is well-
established that where a statute sets forth multiple, divisible 
ways of committing a particular crime—e.g., where a statute 
contains separate subsections, elements, or phrases 
differentiating violent from non-violent ways of committing 
an offense—the sentencing court may resort to Shepard-
approved documents to “determine which statutory phrase 
(contained within a statutory provision that covers several 
different generic crimes) covered a prior conviction.”  
Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 37 (2009); accord Johnson 
v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1265, 1273 (2010); Chambers v. 
United States, 555 U.S. 122, 126 (2009).  In Nijhawan, the 
Supreme Court expounded upon the proper inquiry in these 
cases, explaining: 
[S]ometimes a separately numbered subsection 
of a criminal statute will refer to several 
different crimes, each described separately.  
And it can happen that some of these crimes 
involved violence while others do not.  A single 
Massachusetts statute section entitled “Breaking 
and Entering at Night,” for example, 
criminalizes breaking into a “building, ship, 
vessel or vehicle.”  Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 266, 
§ 16 (West 2006).  In such an instance, we have 
said, a court must determine whether an 
offender’s prior conviction was for the violent, 
rather than the nonviolent, break-ins that this 
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single five-word phrase describes (e.g., 
breaking into a building rather than a vessel), by 
examining “the indictment or information and 
jury instructions,” or, if a guilty plea is at issue, 
by examining the plea agreement, plea 
colloquy, or “some comparable judicial record” 
of the factual basis for the plea. 
557 U.S. at 33.  Moreover, Shepard authorizes sentencing 
courts to look to “any explicit factual finding by the trial 
judge to which the defendant assented,” which includes far 
more than merely the precise statutory provision to which the 
defendant pleaded guilty.  See Shepard, 544 U.S. at 16 
(emphasis added). 
Applying these principles to Marrero’s case, we 
conclude that the District Court properly examined Marrero’s 
simple assault plea colloquy transcript—a Shepard-approved 
document—to determine whether he pleaded guilty to 
intentional, knowing, or reckless assault.  Pennsylvania’s 
simple assault statute expressly lists those three different 
ways of violating § 2701(a).  Upon examining the plea 
colloquy transcript, the District Court correctly concluded 
that Marrero’s conviction was for intentional (or, at the very 
least, knowing) simple assault.  Marrero admitted to placing 
his hands around his wife’s neck and attempting to pull her up 
a flight of stairs.  This constituted intent to cause bodily 
injury, which we have already held qualifies as a crime of 
violence.  Johnson, 587 F.3d at 212. 
B 
 Because Marrero could not properly be designated a 
career offender unless both of his state convictions were 
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“crimes of violence,” we now consider whether his third-
degree murder conviction so qualified.  Under Pennsylvania’s 
general homicide statute, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2501(a), 
“[a] person is guilty of criminal homicide if he intentionally, 
knowingly, recklessly or negligently causes the death of 
another human being.”  Section 2501(b) classifies homicides 
as either “murder, voluntary manslaughter, or involuntary 
manslaughter.”  Pennsylvania recognizes three types of 
murder: 
(a) Murder of the first degree—A criminal 
homicide constitutes murder of the first degree 
when it is committed by an intentional killing. 
(b) Murder of the second degree—A criminal 
homicide constitutes murder of the second 
degree while defendant was engaged as a 
principal or an accomplice in the perpetration of 
a felony. 
(c) Murder of the third degree—All other kinds 
of murder shall be murder of the third degree.  
Murder of the third degree is a felony of the 
first degree. 
Id. § 2502.  Although the statute itself only defines third-
degree murder as a catch-all without describing the elements 
of the offense, the Pennsylvania Superior Court has specified 
that third-degree murder is “an unlawful killing with malice 
but without specific intent to kill.”  Commonwealth v. 
Dunphy, 20 A.3d 1215, 1219 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011); accord 
Commonwealth v. Tielsch, 934 A.2d 81, 84 n.3 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 2007).  And “malice” is defined as 
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“wickedness of disposition, hardness of heart, 
cruelty, recklessness of consequences, and a 
mind regardless of social duty, although a 
particular person may not be intended to be 
injured,” [and] malice may be found where the 
defendant consciously disregarded an 
unjustifiable and extremely high risk that his 
actions might cause serious bodily injury. 
Commonwealth v. DiStefano, 782 A.2d 574, 582 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 2001) (quoting Commonwealth v. Cottam, 616 A.2d 988, 
1004 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992)); see also Commonwealth v. 
Kling, 731 A.2d 145, 148 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) (“A defendant 
must display a conscious disregard for almost certain death or 
injury such that it is tantamount to an actual desire to injure or 
kill; at the very least, the conduct must be such that one could 
reasonably anticipate death or serious bodily injury would 
likely and logically result.”). 
 Based on this definition, Marrero cites Begay to argue 
that third-degree murder cannot be a crime of violence 
because malice, the essential mens rea, might entail 
recklessness only.  Marrero’s reliance upon Begay is 
misplaced, however, because Begay’s prohibition on counting 
reckless crimes as crimes of violence applies only in residual 
clause cases.  See, e.g., Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 
2267, 2275–76 (2011) (describing Begay as a decision 
“concerning the reach of ACCA’s residual clause”); United 
States v. Angiano, 602 F.3d 828, 829 (7th Cir. 2010) (finding 
Begay “inapposite” to a case involving the enumerated 
offense of burglary of a dwelling under § 2L1.2 of the 
Guidelines because “Begay . . . only classified the prior 
convictions under the residual clause”); United States v. 
Patillar, 595 F.3d 1138, 1140 (10th Cir. 2010) (describing 
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Begay as a case interpreting the residual clause); see also 
United States v. Peterson, 629 F.3d 432, 437 (4th Cir. 2011) 
(holding that the generic definition for the enumerated crime 
of violence of “manslaughter” was a “homicide that ‘is 
committed recklessly’” (quoting Model Penal Code § 210.3 
(1962))).  Thus, Begay does not control this case.  Rather, 
whether Marrero’s third-degree murder conviction qualifies 
as a crime of violence depends on the enumeration of 
“murder” in Application Note 1 to § 4B1.2. 
 Application Note 1 expressly states that the term 
“‘[c]rime of violence’ includes murder.”  Consistent with the 
categorical approach prescribed by Taylor for predicate 
offenses expressly listed as “crimes of violence,” we 
previously held that “no inquiry into the facts of the predicate 
offense is permitted when a predicate conviction is 
enumerated as a ‘crime of violence’ in [then-]Application 
Note 2 to § 4B1.2.”  United States v. McQuilkin, 97 F.3d 723, 
728 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that a defendant’s aggravated 
assault conviction, even though based on reckless conduct, 
counted as a crime of violence because aggravated assault 
was enumerated in the application note); accord United States 
v. McClenton, 53 F.3d 584 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that 
burglary of an unoccupied hotel room was a crime of violence 
because burglary of a dwelling was enumerated in § 4B1.2).  
Since we decided McQuilkin, nothing has called into question 
our prior conclusion that offenses listed in what is now 
Application Note 1 to § 4B1.2 should be considered 
“enumerated” offenses for purposes of the crime-of-violence 
analysis. 
 First, basic interpretative principles and a plain reading 
of Application Note 1 compel the same conclusion now as we 
reached in McQuilkin.  “[C]ommentary in the Guidelines 
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Manual that interprets or explains a guideline is authoritative 
unless it violates the Constitution or a federal statute, or is 
inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, that 
guideline.”  Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38 (1993); 
accord Johnson, 587 F.3d at 207.  Application Note 1 does 
not conflict with federal law and is not an erroneous reading 
of USSG § 4B1.2.  It merely supplements the numbered 
provisions of § 4B1.2 and unambiguously states that “‘crime 
of violence’ includes” ten specific crimes.  USSG § 4B1.2 
cmt. n.1 (emphasis added); cf. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 597 (“[I]f 
Congress had meant to include only an especially dangerous 
subclass of burglaries as predicate offenses, it is unlikely that 
it would have used the unqualified language ‘is burglary . . .’ 
in § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) [of ACCA].”). 
 Furthermore, several of our sister circuits have 
concluded or suggested that the ten offenses listed in 
Application Note 1 are “enumerated” for purposes of the 
crime-of-violence analysis.  See United States v. Lockley, 632 
F.3d 1238, 1242 (11th Cir. 2011) (finding that robbery is an 
enumerated offense); Peterson, 629 F.3d at 436–37 (treating 
“manslaughter” in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) cmt. 1 as an 
enumerated offense); Patillar, 595 F.3d at 1140 (“Nor is 
larceny from the person one of the offenses enumerated in 
either § 4B1.2(a)(2) . . . or the application note, see id. 
§ 4B1.2 cmt n.1 . . . .” (emphasis added)); United States v. 
Walker, 595 F.3d 441, 443–44 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[The] 
application note specifically includes ‘robbery’ as a ‘crime of 
violence’ under § 4B1.2(a). . . . [T]he Supreme Court held in 
Taylor that where a specific offense—in Taylor, burglary—is 
listed as a qualifying violent felony, ‘then the trial court need 
find only that the state statute corresponds in substance to the 
generic meaning of burglary.’” (quoting Taylor, 495 U.S. at 
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599)); United States v. Otero, 495 F.3d 393, 401 (7th Cir. 
2007) (“Given that robbery is enumerated as a ‘crime of 
violence’ under the Guidelines and [the defendant’s] 
conviction for strong-armed robbery was classified as an 
adult conviction, the district court did not err in finding that 
[the defendant] qualified as a career offender.”). 
 Consistent with these precedents, we reaffirm that 
offenses listed in Application Note 1 are “enumerated” for 
purposes of the crime-of-violence analysis.  The District 
Court reached the same conclusion, but erred when it held 
that the enumeration of “murder” was alone sufficient to 
render third-degree murder under Pennsylvania law a crime 
of violence.  As we shall explain, the Court should have 
proceeded to apply the additional steps set forth by the 
Supreme Court in Taylor. 
In Taylor the Court concluded that Congress did not 
intend for offenses enumerated as crimes of violence to take 
on whatever meaning state statutes ascribe to them; rather, 
Congress sought to use “uniform, categorical definitions . . . 
regardless of technical definitions and labels under state law.”  
Taylor, 495 U.S. at 590.  The Court reasoned that it was 
“implausible that Congress intended the meaning of 
‘burglary’ for purposes of [ACCA’s] § 924(e) to depend on 
the definition adopted by the State of conviction.”  Id.  The 
Court thus identified a generic definition of burglary that 
Congress likely intended in the statute, id. at 596–99, and 
sought to compare that definition with “burglary” under 
Missouri law, id. at 602.  Unable to discover in the record 
which Missouri statute formed the basis for Taylor’s prior 
convictions, it remanded for further proceedings.  Id. 
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The Taylor analysis must be applied in enumerated-
offense cases like this one.  “Where, as here, the Guidelines 
specifically designate a certain offense as a ‘crime of 
violence,’ we compare the elements of the crime of 
conviction to the generic form of the offense as defined by the 
States, learned treatises, and the Model Penal Code.”  
Lockley, 632 F.3d at 1242; accord Peterson, 629 F.3d at 435–
37; United States v. Ramon Silva, 608 F.3d 663, 665 (10th 
Cir. 2010); Walker, 595 F.3d at 443–44; United States v. 
Watkins, 54 F.3d 163, 166 (3d Cir. 1995) (comparing a 
Pennsylvania burglary statute to the “generic” definition of 
burglary announced in Taylor).  In other words, “[f]irst, a 
court must distill a ‘generic’ definition of the predicate 
offense based on how the offense is defined ‘in the criminal 
codes of most states.’”  Peterson, 629 F.3d at 436 (emphasis 
omitted) (quoting Taylor, 495 U.S. at 598).  “Second, after 
finding the generic form of the predicate offense, a court must 
determine whether the defendant’s prior conviction 
constituted a conviction of the generic offense . . . by 
comparing the elements of the crime of conviction with the 
generic offense.”  Id.  So long as the statutory definition of 
the prior conviction “substantially corresponds” to the generic 
definition of the offense, the defendant’s prior offense 
qualifies as a crime of violence.  Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602; 
accord, e.g., Ramon Silva, 608 F.3d at 665.  If, on the other 
hand, the “statutory definition of the prior conviction 
proscribes a range of conduct that is broader than [the] 
generic [offense],” we look to the Shepard-approved sources 
to determine whether the jury or judge was required to find or 
the defendant was required to admit all of the elements of the 
generic offense in order to be convicted.  Ramon Silva, 608 
F.3d at 665.  We apply this enumerated-offense approach to 
 19 
 
cases, like this one, in which the crime of conviction is listed 
in either § 4B1.2(a)(2) or Application Note 1 to § 4B1.2. 
 In Marrero’s case, we begin by adopting a generic 
definition for “murder.”  The goal of a generic definition of 
an enumerated offense is to capture the “offense as 
envisioned by the Guidelines’ drafters,” Lockley, 632 F.3d at 
1242, by looking to the Model Penal Code (MPC), state laws, 
and learned treatises.  See, e.g., Taylor, 495 U.S. at 598; 
Lockley, 632 F.3d at 1242; Peterson, 629 F.3d at 436; Walker, 
595 F.3d at 446.  As far as we are aware, no federal court has 
yet adopted a generic definition of murder for the crime-of-
violence analysis. 
The MPC is an ideal starting point.  Section 210.2 of 
the MPC provides that criminal homicide constitutes murder 
when: 
(a) it is committed purposely or knowingly; 
or 
 (b)  it is committed recklessly under 
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference 
to the value of human life.  Such recklessness 
and indifference are presumed if the actor is 
engaged or is an accomplice in the commission 
of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after 
committing or attempting to commit robbery, 
rape or deviate sexual intercourse by force or 
threat of force, arson, burglary, kidnapping or 
felonious escape. 
Similarly, Black’s Law Dictionary defines “murder” as “[t]he 
killing of a human being with malice aforethought.”  Id. at 
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1114 (9th ed. 2009).  “Depraved-heart murder” is “a murder 
resulting from an act so reckless and careless of the safety of 
others that it demonstrates the perpetrator’s complete lack of 
regard for human life.”  Id.  “Unintentional murder” is “[a] 
killing for which malice is implied because the person acted 
with intent to cause serious physical injury or knew that the 
conduct was substantially certain to cause death or serious 
physical injury.”  Id. at 1114–15. 
As with burglary in Taylor, 495 U.S. at 598, state-law 
definitions of murder vary widely but share a common 
definitional strand.  The majority of state murder statutes 
criminalize at least three types of murder: (1) intentional 
killing; (2) killing during the commission of a felony; and (3) 
killing that, although unintentional, occurs in the course of 
dangerous conduct that demonstrates a reckless or malignant 
disregard for serious risks posed to human life.2
                                                 
2 All fifty states and the District of Columbia recognize 
intentional or premeditated murder, and forty-four states and 
the District of Columbia define a felony murder offense.  At 
least thirty states define a form of unintentional murder 
involving a substantial likelihood of death, indifference (often 
“extreme indifference”) to the value of human life, an 
abandoned, malignant, or depraved heart, express or implied 
malice, or recklessness.  See Ala. Code § 13A-6-2 (2011); 
Alaska Stat. Ann. §§ 11.41.100, .110 (West 2007); Ariz. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 13-1104 to -1105 (West 2010); Ark. Code Ann. 
§§ 5-10-102 to -103 (West 2008); Cal. Penal Code §§ 187–
188 (West 2012); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 18-3-102 (West 
2004); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 53a-54a, -54c (West 2007); 
Del. Code Ann. tit 11, §§ 635–636 (West 2010); D.C. Code 
§ 22-2101 (2001); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 782.04 (West 2007); Ga. 
  We 
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Code Ann. § 16-5-1 (West 2009); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 707-701 
(West 2008); Idaho Code Ann. §§ 18-4001, -4003 (West 
2011); 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/9-1 (West 2002); Ind. 
Code Ann. § 35-42-1-1 (West 2004); Iowa Code Ann. 
§§ 701.1–.3 (West 2003); Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 21-5402 to -
5403 (West 2008); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 507.020 (West 
2006); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:30–:30.1 (West 2007); Me. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17, §§ 201–202 (2006); Md. Code Ann., 
Criminal Law §§ 2-201, -204 (West 2002); Mass. Gen. Laws 
Ann. ch. 265, § 1 (West 2008); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. 
§§ 750.316–.317 (West 2004); Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 609.185, 
.195 (West 2009); Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-19 (West 2011); 
Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 565.020–.021 (West 1999); Mont. Code 
Ann. § 45-5-102 (2009); Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 28-303 to -304 
(2009); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 200.010 (West 2000); N.H. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 630:1-a to -b (2007); N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 2C:11-3 (West 2005); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-2-1 (West 
2003); N.Y. Penal Law §§ 125.25, .27 (McKinney’s 2009); 
N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 14-17 (West 2000); N.D. Cent. Code 
Ann. § 12.1-16-01 (West 2008); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 
§ 2903.02 (West 2006); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, §§ 701.7–.8 
(West 2002); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 163.005 (West 2003); 18 
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 2502 (1998); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. 
§ 11-23-1 (West 2012); S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-10 (2003); 
S.D. Codified Laws §§ 22-16-4, -7 (2006); Tenn. Code Ann. 
§ 39-13-202 (West 2011); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.02(b) 
(West 2003); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (West 2004); Vt. 
Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 2301 (West 2007); Va. Code Ann. 
§§ 18.2-32 to -33 (West 2012); Wash. Rev. Code 
§§ 9A.32.030, .050 (West 2009); W. Va. Code Ann. § 61-2-1 
(West 2002); Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 940.01-.03 (West 2005); 
Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-2-101, -104 (West 2007). 
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incorporate each of these pervasive aspects of contemporary, 
widely accepted definitions of murder.  Cf. Taylor, 495 U.S. 
at 598 (concluding that “[a]lthough the exact formulations 
vary, the generic, contemporary meaning of burglary [should] 
contain[] at least” several common elements appearing in the 
examined sources).  Accordingly, we hold that murder is 
generically defined as causing the death of another person 
either intentionally, during the commission of a dangerous 
felony, or through conduct evincing reckless and depraved 
indifference to serious dangers posed to human life. 
 We further hold that the meaning of third-degree 
murder under Pennsylvania law “substantially corresponds” 
to the third prong of this generic definition.  In Pennsylvania, 
third-degree murder is “an unlawful killing with malice but 
without specific intent to kill.”  Dunphy, 20 A.3d at 1219.  
Malice, in turn, involves “hardness of heart, cruelty, and 
recklessness of consequences.”  DiStefano, 782 A.2d at 582.  
Malice exists “where the defendant consciously disregarded 
an unjustifiable and extremely high risk that his actions might 
cause serious bodily injury.”  Id.  Pennsylvania courts have 
held that the “reckless disregard for consequences” essential 
to malice requires that the defendant “display a conscious 
disregard for almost certain death or injury such that it is 
tantamount to an actual desire to injure or kill; at the very 
least, the conduct must be such that one could reasonably 
anticipate death or serious bodily injury would likely and 
logically result.”  Kling, 731 A.2d at 148.  This mens rea 
requirement for third-degree murder mirrors the “reckless and 
depraved indifference to the serious dangers posed to human 
life” in the generic definition we have identified.  Thus, third-
degree murder under Pennsylvania law is equivalent to the 
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enumerated offense of “murder” and therefore qualifies as a 
crime of violence under the Guidelines. 
III 
 Because Marrero’s third-degree murder and simple 
assault convictions both qualify as crimes of violence under 
USSG § 4B1.2, he was properly designated a career offender 
under USSG § 4B1.1.  It follows that Marrero’s Guidelines 
range was properly calculated and that the District Court did 
not err.  Accordingly, we will affirm. 
